

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

54

Action

(2)

EUR

SECRET

Control: 15686

Rec'd: JULY 24, 1961

2:29 PM

Info

FROM: BERLIN

SS  
G  
SP  
L  
H  
SB  
SO  
IO  
FX  
TOP  
SCA  
INRTO: Secretary of State Copy No(s) 102, 105

NO: 87, JULY 24, 6 PM Destroyed in RM/R

Name 0177Date 12/1/74RM/R  
CONTROL COPYACTION BONN 73, DEPARTMENT 87, INFORMATION LONDON 44, PARIS 45,  
MOSCOW 42.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL AND FINN.

RE DEPTEL 172 BONN, 68 BERLIN.

DEPT'S ANALYSIS EAST GERMAN UNREST AND DILEMMA FACING SOVS  
AND US IS SIMILAR TO OURS. CERTAINLY IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO  
FOMENT FURTHER DETERIORATION CONDITIONS THERE AS LONG AS NO  
ANSWER CAN BE GIVEN TO AMB. DOWLING'S QUESTION AS TO WHAT  
WE WOULD DO IF EAST GERMANS ROSE IN REVOLT.

WITH REFERENCE TO OBSERVATION THAT SOVS FOR MOMENT SEEM TO  
BE TOLERATING LOSS OF REFUGEES WHILE PRESSING TOWARD  
DECISION ON BERLIN, I THINK THIS RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE  
EXAMINED VERY CLOSELY. PROSPECT OF INTOLERABLE LOSS OF  
REFUGEES AND/OR FEARS OF INCIPIENT REVOLT MIGHT WELL LEAD  
KHRUSHCHEV TO CEASE PRESSING TOWARD BERLIN DECISION. IF HE  
COMES TO REALIZE EXTENT TO WHICH THREAT OF SEPARATE GDR PEACE  
TREATY WITH ATTENDANT CLOSING OF ESCAPE ROUTE IS MAJOR  
CAUSE OF EXODUS AND UNREST, WITH ECONOMIC CAUSES SECONDARY,  
HE WOULD IN OUR OPINION BE MORE LIKELY TO HOLD BACK  
RATHER THAN TO PRECIPITATE SHOWDOWN. KHRUSHCHEV WOULD  
ALSO HAVE TO WEIGH WHAT REACTION EAST GERMAN POPULATION WOULD  
BE IF SUCH TREATY BECAME REALITY, NOT MERE THREAT. IN SHORT  
IT IS POSSIBLE WE MAY HAVE HERE ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT DETERRENTS  
TO SOV ACTION ON BERLIN, IN WHICH CASE SITUATION PERHAPS  
CALLS FOR SOMETHING MORE THAN "OUR HELPING ADVERTISE FACTS  
TO WORLD."

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-2- 87, JULY 24, 6 PM FROM BERLIN

BETWEEN EXTREMES OF AIDING AND ABETTING UNREST IN EAST GERMANY AND OF ADVERTISING FACTS TO WORLD THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF TAKING CERTAIN QUIET BUT EFFECTIVE STEPS.

MIGHT MENTION SOMETHING BRANDT TOLD  
COMMANDANTS JULY 21; THAT IT WAS BY NO MEANS IMPOSSIBLE  
FOUR MILLION EAST GERMANS MIGHT FLEE TO WEST BEFORE  
END OF YEAR IF THEY BELIEVED SEPARATE GDR PEACE TREATY  
WAS IMMINENT. WHAT HAPPENS AFTERWARDS TO POPULATION WHICH  
NO LONGER HAS EASY ESCAPE ROUTE THROUGH WEST BERLIN IS  
UNPREDICTABLE BUT WHOLE THING IS DANGEROUS TINDERBOX CAUSED  
SOLELY BY SOV INSISTENCE ON UNILATERAL SOLUTION.

IN THIS CONNECTION CONSIDERATION MIGHT ALSO BE GIVEN  
TO REMINDING SOVS THROUGH INFORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS  
OF OUR RESTRAINT WITH RESPECT TO THE REFUGEES; FACT THAT  
NEITHER WEST GERMANS NOR ALLIES HAVE EVER URGED EAST GERMANS  
TO FLEE TO THE WEST; ON CONTRARY POLICY HAS BEEN ONE  
OF DISCOURAGEMENT, AND EVEN AT PRESENT TIME POLICY IS TO  
REFRAIN FROM ANYTHING THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS URGING  
ANYONE TO COME WEST. AT APPROPRIATE TIME MIGHT BE USEFUL  
DROP HINTS WE COULD EASILY CHANGE THIS POLICY WHICH COULD  
OVERNIGHT DRASTICALLY WORSEN INTERNAL GDR SITUATION.

POINT COULD ALSO BE MADE THAT UNSATISFACTORY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL  
CONDITIONS IN EAST ZONE ARE OBVIOUSLY RESULT OF SOVIET POLICIES  
AND ACTIONS, IN PARTICULAR SOVIET RELIANCE ON INCOMPETENT  
EAST GERMAN STALINIST-ERA HOLDOVERS AND THAT SOVS SHOULD

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-3- 87, JULY 24, 6 PM FROM BERLIN

REALIZE IT IS NEITHER IN THEIR INTEREST NOR OURS THAT  
SITUATION IN EAST GERMANY BE PERMITTED TO DETERIORATE  
TO POINT OF INTERNAL DISORDERS THAT COULD LEAD TO UPRISING  
SIMILAR TO 1953 OR TO HUNGARIAN REVOLT OF 1956.

LIGHTNER